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ABSTRACT:

In accordance with a first aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive program that operates with a secret is made tamper resistant by distributing the secret in space as well as in time. In accordance with a second aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive program is made tamper resistant by obfuscating the program. In accordance with a third aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive application is made tamper resistant by isolating its security sensitive functions, and making the isolated security sensitive functions tamper resistant by distributing the secrets of the security sensitive functions in time as well as in space, and/or obfuscating the security sensitive functions. In one embodiment where obfuscation is employed, the pseudo-randomly selected pattern(s) of mutations is (are) unique for each installation. In accordance with a fourth aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive system with security sensitive applications is made further tamper resistant by deploying an interlocking trust mechanism. In accordance with a fifth aspect of the present invention, a content industry association, in conjunction with content manufacturers, content reader manufacturers, and content player manufacturers of the industry jointly implement a coordinated encryption/decryption scheme, with the player apparatus manufactured by the content player manufacturers employing playing software that include tamper resistant decryption functions.

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(57) Abstract

In accordance with a first aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive program (100) that operates with a secret (101) is made tamper resistant by distributing the secret in space as well as in time. In accordance with a second aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive program is made tamper resistant by obfuscating the program. In accordance with a third aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive application is made tamper resistant by isolating its security sensitive functions, and making the isolated security sensitive functions tamper resistant by distributing the secrets of the security sensitive functions in time as well as in space, and/or obfuscating the security sensitive functions. In one embodiment where obfuscation is employed, the pseudo-randomly selected pattern(s) of mutations is (are) unique for each installation. In accordance with a fourth aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive system with security sensitive applications is made further tamper resistant by deploying an interlocking trust mechanism. In accordance with a fifth aspect of the present invention, a content industry association, in conjunction with content manufacturers, content reader manufacturers, and content player manufacturers of the industry jointly implement a coordinated encryption/decryption scheme, with the player apparatus manufactured by the content player manufacturers employing playing software that include tamper resistant decryption functions.



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# Tamper Resistant Methods And Apparatus

## BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

### 1. Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to the field of system security. More specifically, the present invention relates to the tamper resistant methods and apparatus.

### 2. Background Information

Many applications, e.g. financial transactions, unattended authorizations and content management, require the basic integrity of their operations to be assumed, or at least verified. While a number of security approaches such as encryption and decryption techniques are known in the art, unfortunately, the security approaches can be readily compromised, because these applications and the security approaches are implemented on systems with an open and accessible architecture, that renders both hardware and software including the security approaches observable and modifiable by a malevolent user or a malicious program.

Thus, a system based on open and accessible architecture is a fundamentally insecure platform, notwithstanding the employment of security measures. However, openness and accessibility offer a number of advantages, contributing to these systems' successes. Therefore, what is required are techniques that will render software execution virtually unobservable or unmodifiable on these fundamentally insecure platforms, notwithstanding their openness and accessibility. As will be disclosed in more detail below, the present invention of tamper resistant methods and apparatus achieve these and other desirable results.

## SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

In accordance with a first aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive program that operates with a secret is made tamper resistant by distributing the secret in space as well as in time. The secret is partitioned into a number of subparts, and the security sensitive program is unrolled into a number of subprograms

that operate with th subparts, on subpart per subprogram. The subprograms are then executed over a period of time. In one embodiment, the subprograms are further interleaved with unrelated tasks. In one application, the security sensitive program is a decryption program and the secret is a private key.

In accordance with a second aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive program is made tamper resistant by obfuscating the program. The security sensitive program is divided into a number of subprograms, and a plaintext appearance location schedule is selected for the subprograms. An appropriate mutated initial state is determined for each of the subprograms, except for the subprogram where the program's entry point is located. The mutated initial states are determined based on one or more pseudo-randomly selected patterns of mutations that return the program to the initial state at the end of an execution pass. During execution, the subprograms are recovered when they are needed, one or more but not all at a time, following the pseudo-randomly selected pattern(s) of mutations. In one embodiment, each pseudo-randomly selected pattern of mutations is determined using a predetermined partnership function in conjunction with an ordered set of pseudo-random keys. In one application, the security sensitive program is a decryption program that operates with a secret private key. The decryption program may or may not have been made tamper resistant by distributing the secret private key in time as well as in space.

In accordance with a third aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive application is made tamper resistant by isolating its security sensitive functions, and making the isolated security sensitive functions tamper resistant by distributing the secrets of the security sensitive functions in time as well as in space, and/or obfuscating the security sensitive functions. In one embodiment where obfuscation is employed, the pseudo-randomly selected pattern(s) of mutations is (are) unique for each installation. In one application, the application is a content management application having a decryption function.

In accordance with a fourth aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive system with security sensitive applications is made further tamper resistant by providing a system integrity verification program having tamper resistant integrity verification k mels, that jointly deploy an int rlocking trust mechanism with th tamp r resistant security s nsitive functions of th security sensitiv applications. In one

application, the system is a content manipulation system, and the application is a content management application.

In accordance with a fifth aspect of the present invention, a content industry association, in conjunction with content manufacturers, content reader manufacturers, and content player manufacturers of the industry jointly implement a coordinated encryption/decryption scheme, with the player apparatus manufactured by the content player manufacturers employing playing software that include tamper resistant decryption functions.

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

The present invention will be described by way of embodiments, but not limitations, illustrated in the accompanying drawings in which like references denot similar elements, and in which:

**Figure 1** is a block diagram illustrating a first aspect of the present invention for making a security sensitive program tamper resistant by distributing the program's secret(s) in time and in space;

**Figure 2** is a block diagram illustrating one embodiment of the first aspect of the present invention including a subprogram generator for generating th subprograms that operate with corresponding subparts of the distributed secret(s);

**Figure 3** is a flow diagram illustrating one embodiment of the operational flow of the subprogram generator of **Figure 2**;

**Figure 4** is a block diagram illustrating a second aspect of the present invention for making a security sensitive program tamper resistant by obfuscating th various subparts of the security sensitive program;

**Figure 5** is a block diagram illustrating one embodiment of a subpart of the obfuscated program;

**Figure 6** is a block diagram illustrating one embodiment of the second aspect of the present invention including an obfuscation processor for generating th obfuscated program;

**Figure 7** is a graphical diagram illustrating distribution of key period for the second aspect of the present invention;

**Figures 8a - 8b** are flow diagrams illustrating one embodiment of th operational flow of the obfuscation processor of **Figure 6**;

**Figur 9** is a flow diagram illustrating one embodiment of th operational logic of an obfuscated subprogram of the obfuscated program;

**Figures 10 - 14** are diagrams illustrating a sample application of the second aspect of the present invention;

**Figure 15** is a block diagram illustrating a third aspect of the present invention for making a security sensitive application tamper resistant;

**Figure 16** is a block diagram illustrating a fourth aspect of the present invention for making a security sensitive system tamper resistant;

**Figure 17** is a block diagram illustrating a fifth aspect of the present invention for making security sensitive industry tamper resistant; and

**Figures 18 - 19** are block diagrams illustrating an example computer system and an embedded controller suitable for programming with the various aspects of the present invention.

## DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

In the following description, various aspects of the present invention will be described. However, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced with only some or all aspects of the present invention. For purposes of explanation, specific numbers, materials and configurations are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. However, it will also be apparent to one skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced without the specific details. In other instances, well known features are omitted or simplified in order not to obscure the present invention.

Parts of the description will be presented in terms of operations performed by a computer system, using terms such as data, flags, bits, values, characters, strings, numbers and the like, consistent with the manner commonly employed by those skilled in the art to convey the substance of their work to others skilled in the art. As well understood by those skilled in the art, these quantities take the form of electrical, magnetic, or optical signals capable of being stored, transferred, combined, and otherwise manipulated through mechanical and electrical components of the computer system; and the term computer system include general purpose as well as special purpose data processing machines, systems, and the like, that are standalone, adjunct or embedd d.

Various operations will be described as multiple discrete steps in turn in a manner that is most helpful in understanding the present invention, however, the order of description should not be construed as to imply that these operations are necessarily order dependent, in particular, the order of presentation.

Referring now to **Figure 1**, a block diagram illustrating a first aspect of the present invention is shown. In accordance with this first aspect of the present invention, security sensitive program **100** is made tamper resistant by distributing its secret in space as well as in time. The secret (not shown in totality) is "partitioned" into subparts **101**, and program **100** is unrolled into a number of subprograms **102** that operate with subparts **101**; for the illustrated embodiment, one subpart **101** per subprogram **102**. Subprograms **102** are then executed over a period of time. As a result, the complete secret cannot be observed or modified in any single point in space nor in any single point in time.

For example, consider the artificially simple "security sensitive" program for computing the result of X multiply by S, where S is the secret. Assuming S equals to 8, S can be divided into 4 subparts, with each subpart equals 2, and the "security sensitive" program can be unrolled into 4 subprograms with each program computing A = A + (X multiply by 2). Thus, the complete secret 8 can never be observed or modified in any point in space nor time.

As a further example, consider the "security sensitive" program for computing the result of (X to the power of S) modulo Y, where S again is the secret. If S equals 16, S can be divided into 8 subparts, with each subpart equals 2, and the "security sensitive" program can be unrolled into 8 subprograms with each program computing A = (A multiply by ((X to the power of 2) modulo Y)) modulo Y. Thus, the complete secret 16 can never be observed or modified in any point in space nor time.

As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, the function (X to the power of S) modulo Y is the basis function employed in many asymmetric key (private/public key) schemes for encryption and decryption. Thus, by practicing this first aspect of the present invention, an encryption/decryption function can be made tamper resistant.

In one embodiment, the subprograms are further interleaved with unrelated tasks to further obscure the true nature of the tasks being performed by the unrolled subprograms. The tasks may even have no purpose to them.

**Figure 2** illustrates one embodiment of the first aspect of the present invention including a subprogram generator for generating the subprograms. For the illustrated embodiment, subprogram generator **104** is provided with the secret as input. Furthermore, subprogram generator **104** is provided with access to library **105** having entry, basis and prologue subprograms **106**, **108**, and **109** for used in generating subprograms **102** of a particular security sensitive program in view of the secret provided. In other words, entry and basis subprograms **106** and **108** employed are different for different security sensitive programs. For the above illustrated examples, in the first case, entry and basis subprograms **106** and **108** will initialize and compute A = A + (X multiply by a subpart of S), whereas in the second case, entry and basis subprograms **106** and **108** will initialize and compute A = (A multiply by ((X to the power of a subpart of S) modulo Y)) modulo Y. Prologue subprogram **109** is used to perform post processing, e.g. outputting the computed results as decrypted content.

For the illustrated embodiment, entry subprogram **106** is used in particular to initialize an appropriate runtime table **110** for looking up basis values by basis subprogram **108**, and basis subprogram **108** is used to perform the basis computation using runtime table **110**. For the modulo function example discussed above, runtime table **110** is used to return basis values for (X to the power of a subpart of secret) modulo Y for various subpart values, and basis subprogram **108** is used to perform the basis computation of A = (A multiply by (basis value of a subpart of secret)) modulo Y, where A equals the accumulated intermediate results. A's initial value is 1.

For example, entry subprogram **106** may initialize a runtime table **110** of size three for storing the basis values of bv1, bv2 and bv3, where bv1, bv2 and bv3 equal (X to the power of 1) modulo Y, (X to the power of 2) modulo Y, and (X to the power of 3) modulo Y respectively. For the modulo function (X to the power 5) modulo Y, subprogram generator **104** may partition the secret 5 into two subparts with subpart valu s 3 and 2, and generat two basis programs **108** computing A = (A * Lkup(3)) m dulo Y and A = (A * Lkup(2)) modulo Y respectiv ly.

**Figure 3** illustrates one embodiment of the operational flow of subprogram generator **104** of **Figure 2**. For the illustrated embodiment, upon invocation, subprogram generator **104** first generates an instance of entry subprogram **106** for initializing at least an appropriate runtime lookup table **110** (Lkup) for returning the basis values of a modulo function for various subparts of a secret, and an accumulation variable (A) to an appropriate initial state, step **112**. Subprogram generator **104** then partitions the secret into subparts, step **114**. In on embodiment, the partition is performed to require the least number of basis programs, within the constraint of the basis values stored in runtime table **110**.

Next, subprogram generator **104** sets a subpart of the secret as the lookup index (LIDX), steps **116**. Then, subprogram generator **104** generates the current basis subprogram to compute A = [A multiply by Lkup (LIDX)] modulo Y, step **118**. Subprogram generator **104** repeats steps **116 - 118** for all subparts, until a basis program has been generated for each subpart of the secret, step **120**. Finally, subprogram generator **104** generates an instance of prologue subprogram **109** for performing post processing, as described earlier, step **122**.

**Figure 4** illustrates a second aspect of the present invention. In accordance with this second aspect of the present invention, security sensitive program **203** is made tamper resistant by obfuscating the program. Security sensitiv program **203** is divided and processed into a number of obfuscated subprograms **204**. A plaintext (i.e. unmutated) appearance location schedule (i.e. where in memory) is selected for obfuscated subprograms **204**. For the illustrated embodiment, the plaintext appearance location schedule is formulated in terms of the memory cells **202** of two memory segments, memory segment **201a** and memory segment **201b**. Initially, except for the obfuscated subprogram **204** where the program's entry point is located, all other obfuscated subprograms **204** are stored in mutated states. Obfuscated subprograms **204** are recovered or made to appear in plaintext form at the desired memory cells **202**, one or more at a time, when they are needed for execution, and mutated again, once executions are completed. As will be described in more detail below, the initial mutated states, and the process of recovery are determined or performed, in accordance with one or more pseudo-randomly s lected patt rn of mutations. The pseudo-randomly s lected pattern(s) of mutations is (are) determined using a predetermined mutation partn rship function in

conjunction with one or mor ordered sets of pseudo-random keys. As a result, obfuscated subprograms **204** cyclically mutate back to their respective initial states after each execution pass. Actually, obfuscated subprograms **204** implementing the same loop also cyclically mutate back to the loop entry states after each pass through the loop.

For the illustrated embodiment, each obfuscated subprogram **204** and each cell **202** are of the same size, and first memory segment **201a** is located in high memory, whereas second memory segment **201b** is located in low memory. Furthermore, there are even number of obfuscated subprograms **204**, employing dummy subprogram if necessary.

**Figure 5** illustrated one embodiment of subprogram **204**. In accordance with the present invention, for the illustrated embodiment, in addition to original subprogram **102**, obfuscated subprogram **204** is provided with mutation partner identification function **206**, mutation function **207**, partner key **208** and jump block **209**. Original subprogram **102** performs a portion of the functions performed by program **200**. Original subprogram **102** may be an entry/basis/prologue subprogram **106/108/109** in accordance with the first aspect of the present invention. Mutation partner identification function **206** is used to identify the partner memory cells **202** for all memory cell **202** at each mutation round. In one embodiment, the partner identification function **206** is the function: Partner Cell ID = Cell ID XOR Pseudo-Random Key. For a pseudo-random key, mutation partner identification function **206** will identify a memory cell **202** in the second memory segment **201b** as the partner memory cell for of a memory cell **202** in the first memory segment **201a**, and vice versa. Only ordered sets of pseudo-random keys that will provide the required periods for the program and its loops will be employed. The length of a period is a function of the pseudo-random keys' set size (also referred to as key length). Mutation function **207** is used to mutate the content of the various memory cells **202**. In one embodiment, mutation function **207** XORs the content of each memory cell **202** in first memory segment **201a** into the partner memory cell **202** in second memory segment **201b** in an odd mutation round, and XORS the content of each memory cell **202** in second memory segment **201b** into the partner memory cell **202** in first memory segment **201a** in an even mutation round. Partner key **208** is the ps udo-random key to be us d by mutation partner identification function **206** to identify mutation partners of th various m mory cells **202** for a

mutation round. Jump block **209** transfers execution control to the next obfuscat d subprogram **204**, which at the time of transfer, has been recovered into plaintext through the pseudo-random pattern of mutations.

In one embodiment, an obfuscated subprogram **204** may also include other functions being performed for other purposes or simply unrelated functions being performed to further obscure the subpart functions being performed.

**Figure 6** illustrates one embodiment of the second aspect of the present invention including an obfuscation processor for processing and transforming subprograms into obfuscated subprograms. For the illustrated embodiment, obfuscation processor **214** is provided with program **200** as inputs. Furthermore, obfuscation processor **214** is provided with access to pseudo-random keys' key length lookup table **212**, mutation partner identification function **206**, and mutation function **207**. For the illustrated embodiment, obfuscation processor **214** also uses two working matrices **213** during generation of obfuscated program **203**.

Key length lookup table **212** provides obfuscation processor **214** with key lengths that provide the required periods by the program and its loops. Key lengths that will provide the required periods is a function of the mutation technique and the partnership function. **Figure 7** illustrates various key lengths that will provide various periods for the first and second memory segment mutation technique and the partnership function described above.

Referring back to **Figure 6**, mutation partner identification function **206** identifies a mutation partner memory cell **202** for each memory cell **202**. In one embodiment, mutation partner identification function **206** identifies mutation partner memory cells in accordance with the "XOR" mutation partner identification function described earlier. Mutation function **207** mutates all memory cells **202**. In one embodiment, mutation function **207** mutates memory cells **202** in accordance with the two memory segments, odd and even round technique described earlier.

For the illustrated embodiment, working matrices **213** include two matrices M1 and M2. Working matrix M1 stores the Boolean functions of the current state of th various memory cells **202** in terms of the initial valu s of m mory cells **202**. Working matrix M2 stores the Boolean functions for recov ring th plaintext of

the various obfuscated subprograms **204** in terms of the initial values of memory cells **202**.

Referring now to **Figures 8a - 8b**, two block diagrams illustrating one embodiment of obfuscation processor **214** are shown. For the illustrated embodiment, as shown in **Fig. 8a** in response to a program input (in object form), obfuscation processor **214** analyzes the program, step **216**. In particular, obfuscation processor **214** analyzes branch flow of the program, identifying loops within the program, using conventional compiler optimization techniques known in the art. For the purpose of this application, any execution control transfer, such as a call and subsequent return, is also considered a "loop".

Next, obfuscation processor **214** may perform an optional step of peephole randomization, step **218**. During this step, a peephole randomization pass over the program and replaces code patterns with random equivalent patterns chosen from an optional dictionary of such patterns. Whether it is performed depends on whether the machine architecture of the instructions provide alternate ways of accomplishing the same task.

Then, obfuscation processor **214** restructures and partitions the program **200** into a number of equal size subprograms **204** organized by their loop levels, padding the subprograms **204** if necessary, based on the analysis results, step **220**. Except for very simple program with a single execution path, virtually all programs **200** will require some amount of restructuring. Restructuring includes e.g. removing as well as adding branches, and replicating instructions in different loop levels. Restructuring is also performed using conventional compiler optimization techniques.

Finally, obfuscation processor **214** determines the subprograms' plaintext appearance location schedule, and the initial state values for the various memory cells **202**, step **221**.

**Fig. 8b** illustrates step **221** in further detail. As shown, obfuscation processor **214** first initializes first working matrix **M1**, step **222**. Then, obfuscation processor **214** selects a memory cell for the program's entry subprogram to appear in plaintext, step **223**. In one embodiment, the memory cell **202** is arbitrarily selected

(within the proper memory segment **201a** or **201b**). Once selected, obfuscation processor **214** updates the second working matrix M2, step **224**.

Next, obfuscation processor **214** selects an appropriate key length based on the procedure's period requirement, accessing key length table **212**, step **226**. Obfuscation processor **214** then generates an ordered set of pseudo-random keys based on the selected key length, step **228**. For example, if key length equals 5 is selected among the key lengths that will provide a required period of 30, obfuscation processor **214** may randomly select 17, 18, 20, 24 and 16 as the ordered pseudo-random keys.

Next, obfuscation processor **214** determines the partner memory cells **202** for all memory cells **202** using the predetermined mutation partner identification function **206** and the next key in the selected set of ordered pseudo-random keys, step **230**. Upon making the determination, obfuscation processor **214** simulates a mutation, and updates M1 to reflect the results of the mutation, step **232**.

Once mutated, obfuscation processor **214** selects a memory cell for the next subprogram **204** to appear in plaintext, step **234**. Having done so, obfuscation processor **214** updates M2, and incrementally invert M2 using the Guassian Method, step **235**. In one embodiment, instead of incremental inversion, obfuscation processor **214** may just verify M2 remains invertable instead. If M2 is not invertable, obfuscation processor **214** cancels the memory cell selection, and restores M2 to its prior state, step **237**. Obfuscation processor **214** repeats steps **234 - 236** to select another memory cell **202**. Eventually, obfuscation processor **214** becomes successful.

Once succeeded, obfuscation processor **214** determines if there was a loop level change, step **238**. If there was a loop level change, obfuscation processor **214** further determines if the loop level change is down level or up level change, i.e. the subprogram is an entry subprogram of a new loop level or a return point of a higher loop level, step **239**. If the loop level change is "down", obfuscation processor **214** selects another appropriate key length based on the new loop's period requirement, accessing key length table **212**, step **241**. Obfuscation processor **214** then generates a new ordered set of pseudo-random keys based on the newly selected key length, step **242**. The newly generated ordered set of pseudo-random

keys becom s th "top" s t of pseudo-random keys. On the other hand, if the loop level change id "up", obfuscation processor **214** restores an immediately "lower" set of pseudo random keys to be the "top" set of pseudo-random keys, step **240**.

Upon properly organizing the "top" set of pseudo-random keys or upon determining there's no loop level change, obfuscation processor **214** again determines the partner memory cells **202** for all memory cells **202** using the predetermined mutation partner identification function **206** and the next key in the "top" set of ordered pseudo-random keys, step **243**. Upon making the determination, obfuscation processor **214** simulates a mutation, and updates M1 to reflect the results of the mutation, step **244**.

Once mutated, obfuscation processor **214** determines if there are more subprograms **204** to process, step **245**. If there are more subprograms **204** to process, obfuscation processor **214** returns to step **234** and proceeds as described earlier. Otherwise, obfuscation processor **214** inserts the mutation partner identification function **206**, the partner key to be used to identify mutation partner memory cells, the mutation function, the jump block, and the address of the next subprogram **204** into each of the obfuscated subprograms **204**, step **246**. Finally, obfuscation processor **214** computes the initial values of the various obfuscated subprograms **204**, and outputs them, steps **247 - 248**.

**Figure 9** illustrates one embodiment of the operational flow of an obfuscated subprogram **204**. For the illustrated embodiment, obfuscated subprogram **204** first executes the functions of the original subprogram, step **250**. For embodiments including additional and/or unrelated functions, they may be executed also. Then obfuscated subprogram **204** executes mutation partner identification function **206** to identify the mutation memory cell partners for all memory cells **202** using the stored partner key, step **252**. Having identified the mutation partners, obfuscated subprogram **204** executes mutation function **207** to mutate the memory cells based on the identified partnership.

Next, depending on whether obfuscated subprogram **204** is the last subprogram in an execution pass, obfuscated subprogram **204** either jumps to the next obfuscated subprogram (which should be in plaintext) or returns to the "caller".

Note that if obfuscated subprogram **204** returns to th "caller", all other obfuscated subprograms **204** are in their respective initial states.

**Figures 10 - 14** illustrate a sample application of this second aspect of the present invention. **Figure 10** illustrates a sample security sensitive program **200** having six subprograms SPGM0 - SPGM5 implementing a simple single level logic, for ease of explanation, with contrived plaintext values of "000", "001", "010", "011", "100" and "111". Thus, the required period is 6. For ease of explanation, a keylength of one will be used, and the pseudo-random key selected is 3. Furthermore, the mutation partnership identification function is simply Partner Cell ID = Cell ID + 3, i.e. cell 0 always pairs with cell 3, cell 1 pairs with cell 4, and cell 2 pairs with cell 5.

**Figure 10** further illustrates at invocation (mutation 0), memory cells (c0 - c5) contains initial values (iv0 - iv5), as reflected by M1. Assuming, cell c0 is chosen for SPGM0, M2 is updated to reflect that the Boolean function for recovering the plaintext of SPGM0 is simply iv0. **Figure 10** further illustrates the values stored in memory cells (c0 - c5) after the first mutation. Note that for the illustrated mutation technique, only the content of the memory cells (c3 - c5) have changed. M1 is updated to reflect the current state. Assuming, cell c3 is chosen for SPGM1, M2 is updated to reflect that the Boolean function for recovering the plaintext of SPGM1 is simply iv0 XOR iv3. Note that for convenience of manipulation, the columns of M2 have been swapped.

**Figure 11** illustrates the values stored in memory cells (c0 - c5) after the second, third and fourth mutations. As shown, the content of half of the memory cells (c0 - c5) changed alternatingly after each mutation. In each case, M1 is updated to reflect the current state. Assuming, cells c1, c4 and c2 are chosen for SPGM2, SPGM3 and SPGM4 respectively after the second, third and fourth mutations respectively, in each case M2 is updated to reflect that the Boolean functions for recovering the plaintexts of SPGM2, SPGM3 and SPGM4, i.e. iv4, iv1, and iv2 XOR iv5.

**Figure 12** illustrates the values stored in memory cells (c0 - c5) after the fifth mutation. As shown, the content of memory cells (c3 - c5) changed as in previous odd rounds of mutation. M1 is updated to reflect the current state.

Assuming, cell c5 is chosen for SPGM5, M2 is updated to reflect that the Boolean function for recovering the plaintext of SPGM5 is iv5.

**Figure 13** illustrates how the initial values iv0 - iv5 are calculated from the inverse of M2, since M2 x ivs = SPGMs, ivs = M2-1 x SPGMs. Note that a "1" in M2-1 denotes the corresponding SPGM is selected, whereas a "0" in M2-1 denotes the corresponding SPGM is not selected, for computing the initial values (iv0 - iv5).

**Figure 14** illustrates the content of the memory cells of the above example during execution. Note that at any point in time, at most only two of the subprograms are observable in their plaintext forms. Note that the pairing of mutation partners is fixed only because of the single pseudo-random key and the simple mutation partner function employed, for ease of explanation. Note also that with another mutation, the content of the memory cells are back to their initial states. In other words, after each execution pass, the subprograms are in their initial states, ready for another invocation.

As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, the above example is unrealistically simple for the purpose of explanation. The plaintext of a subprogram contains many more "0" and "1" bits, making it virtually impossible to distinguish memory cell storing an obfuscated subprogram in a mutated state from a memory cell storing an obfuscated subprogram in plaintext form. Thus, it is virtually impossible to infer the plaintext appearance location schedule from observing the mutations during execution.

**Figure 15** illustrates a third aspect of the present invention. In accordance with this aspect of the present invention, security sensitive application **300** may be made tamper resistant by isolating its security sensitive functions **302** and making them tamper proof by incorporating the first and/or second aspects of the present invention described above.

In employing the above described second aspect of the present invention, different sets of pseudo-random keys will produce a different pattern of mutations, even with the same mutation partner identification function. Thus, copies of the security sensitive application installed on different systems may be made unique by employing a diff rent pattern of mutations through diff rent sets of ps udo-random

keys. Thus, the security sensitive applications installed in different systems are further resistant from class attack, even if the obfuscation scheme is understood from observation on one system.

**Figure 16** illustrates a fourth aspect of the present invention. In accordance with this aspect of the present invention, a security sensitive system **400** may be made tamper resistant by making its security sensitive applications **400a** and **400b** tamper resistant in accordance with the first, second and/or third aspects of the present invention described above. Furthermore, security of system **400** may be further strengthened by providing system integrity verification program (SIVP) **404** having a number of integrity verification kernels (IVKs). For the illustrated embodiment, a first and a second level IVK **406a** and **406b**. First level IVK **406a** has a published external interface for other tamper resistant security sensitive functions (SSFs) **402a - 402b** of the security sensitive applications **400a - 400b** t call. Both IVKs are made tamper resistant in accordance with the first and the second aspects of the present invention described earlier. Together, the tamper resistant SSFs **402a - 402b** and IVKs **406a - 406b** implement an interlocking trust mechanism.

In accordance with the interlocking trust mechanism, for the illustrated embodiment, tamper resistant SSF1 and SSF2 **402a - 402b** are responsible for the integrity of security sensitive applications **400a - 400b** respectively. IVK1 and IVK2 **406a - 406b** are responsible for the integrity of SIVP **404**. Upon verifying the integrity of security sensitive application **400a** or **400b** it is responsible for, SSF1/SSF2 **402a - 402b** will call IVK1 **406a**. In response, IVK1 **406a** will verify the integrity of SIVP **404**. Upon successfully doing so, IVK1 **406a** calls IVK2 **406b**, which in response, will also verify the integrity of SIVP **404**.

Thus, in order to tamper with security sensitive application **400a**, SSF1 **402a**, IVK1 **406a** and IVK2 **406b** must be tamper with at the same time. However, because IVK1 and IVK2 **406a - 406b** are also used by SSF2 and any other SSFs on the system, all other SSFs must be tamper with at the same time.

**Figure 17** illustrates a fifth aspect of the present invention. In accordance with this aspect of the present invention, content industry association **500**, content manufacturers **502**, content reader manufacturers **510** and content

play r manufacturer **506** may jointly implement a coordinat d encryption/decryption scheme, with content players **508** manufactured by content player manufacturers **506** employing playing software that include content decryption function made tamper resistant in accordance with the above described various aspects of the present invention.

Content industry association **500** owns and holds secret private encryption key Kciapri. Content industry association **500** encrypts content manufacturer's secret content encryption key Kc and content player manufacturer's public encryption Kppub for the respective manufacturers **502** and **506** using Kciapri, i.e. Kciapri[Kc] and Kciapri[Kppub].

Content manufacturer **502** encrypts its content product Kc[ctnt] and includes with the content product Kciapri[Kc]. Content reader manufacturer **510** includes with its content reader product **512** the public key of content industry association Kciapub, whereas content player manufacturer **506** includes with its content player product **508** content player manufacturer's secret private play key Kppri, content industry association's public key Kciapub, and the encrypted content player public key Kciapri[Kppub].

During operation, content reader product **512** reads encrypted content Kc[ctnt] and the encrypted content encryption key Kciapri[Kc]. Content reader product **512** decrypts Kc using Kciapub. Concurrently, content player product **508** recovers its public key Kppub by decrypting Kciapri[Kppub] using content industry association's public key Kciapub. Content reader product **512** and content player product **508** are also in communication with each other. Upon recovering its own public key, content player product **508** provides it to content reader product **512**. Content reader product **512** uses the provided player public key Kppub to encrypt the recovered content encryption key Kc, generating Kppub[Kc], which is returned to content player product **508**. In response, content player product **508** recovers content encrypt key Kc by decrypting Kppub[Kc] using its own private key Kppri.

Thus, as content reader product **512** reads encrypted content Kc[ctnt], and forwards them to content player product **508**, content player product **508** decrypts them with the recovered Kc, generating the unencrypted content (ctnt). In accordanc with the above described aspects of the present invention, the decryption

functions for recovering th cont nt play r's manufacturer's public key, and recovering the content encryption key Kc are made tamper resistant.

As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, in addition to being made tamper resistant, by virtue of the interlocking trust, tampering with the content player product's decryption functions will require tampering of the content industry association, content manufacturer and content reader manufacturer's encryption/decryption functions, thus making it virtually impossible to compromise the various encryption/decryption functions' integrity.

As will be also appreciated by those skilled in the art, a manufacturer may play more than one role in the above described tamper resistant industry security scheme, e.g. manufacturing both the content reader and the content player products, as separate or combined products.

**Figure 18** illustrates a sample computer system suitable to be programmed with security sensitive programs/applications with or without SIVP, including industry wise security mechanism, made tamper resistant in accordance with the first, second, third, fourth and/or fifth aspect of the present invention. Sample computer system **600** includes CPU **602** and cache memory **604** coupled to each other through processor bus **605**. Sample computer system **600** also includes high performance I/O bus **608** and standard I/O bus **618**. Processor bus **605** and high performance I/O bus **608** are bridged by host bridge **606**, whereas high performanc I/O bus **608** and standard I/O bus **618** are bridged by bus bridge **610**. Coupled to high performance I/O bus **608** are main memory **612**, and video memory **614**. Coupled to video memory **614** is video display **616**. Coupled to standard I/O bus **618** are mass storage **620**, and keyboard and pointing devices **622**.

These elements perform their conventional functions. In particular, mass storage **620** is used to provide permanent storage for the executable instructions of the various tamper resistant programs/applications, whereas main memory **612** is used to temporarily store the executable instructions tamper resistant programs/applications during execution by CPU **602**.

**Figur 19** illustrat s a sample embedded controller suitable to be programmed with security s nsitive programs for a security sensitive apparatus, mad

tamper resistant in accordance with th first, second, third, fourth and/or fifth aspect of the present invention. Sample embedded system **700** includes CPU **702**, main memory **704**, ROM **706** and I/O controller **708** coupled to each other through system bus **710**. These elements also perform their conventional functions. In particular, ROM **706** may be used to provide permanent and execute-in-place storage for the executable instructions of the various tamper resistant programs, whereas main memory **704** may used to provide temporary storage for various working data during execution of the executable instructions of the tamper resistant programs by CPU **702**.

Thus, various tamper resistant methods and apparatus have been described. While the methods and apparatus of the present invention have been described in terms of the above illustrated embodiments, those skilled in the art will recognize that the invention is not limited to the embodiments described. The present invention can be practiced with modification and alteration within the spirit and scope of the appended claims. The description is thus to be regarded as illustrative instead of restrictive on the present invention.

CLAIMS

What is claimed is:

1. An apparatus comprising:

an execution unit for executing programming instructions; and

a storage medium coupled to the execution unit, having stored therein a plurality of programming instruction blocks to be executed by the execution unit during operation, the programming instruction blocks operating on corresponding subparts of a secret distributed among them, and the execution being distributed over a period of time.

2. The apparatus as set forth in claim 1, wherein the programming instruction blocks jointly implement a decryption function, and the secret is a private key.

3. The apparatus as set forth in claim 1, wherein one or more of the programming instruction blocks further perform one or more unrelated tasks to further obscure the operations on the subparts of the secret.

4. A machine implemented method for executing a program that operates on a secret in a tamper resistant manner, the method comprises the steps of:

a) executing a first unrolled subprogram of the program at a first point a time, with the first unrolled subprogram operating on a first subpart of the secret; and

b) executing a second unrolled subprogram of the program at a second point a time, with the second unrolled subprogram operating on a second subpart of the secret.

5. The method as set forth in claim 3, wherein the first and second unrolled subprograms are unrolled subprograms of a decryption function; and the secret is a private key.

6. The method as set forth in claim 3, wherein

step (a) further includes the first unrolled subprogram performing at least a first unrelated task; and

step (b) further includes the second unrolled subprogram performing at least a second unrelated task;

said at least a first and a second unrelated task are performed to further obscure the first and second unrolled subprograms' operation on the first and second subparts of the secret.

7. An apparatus comprising:

an execution unit for executing programming instructions; and

a storage medium having stored therein a plurality of programming instructions to be executed by the execution unit during operation, wherein when executed, in response to a secret being provided, the programming instructions partition the secret into a plurality of subparts, and generate a plurality of programming instruction blocks that operate on the subparts.

8. The apparatus as set forth in claim 7, wherein the apparatus further includes a library having an entry programming instruction block, and a basis programming instruction block, to be accessed by the programming instructions in generating the programming instruction blocks.

9. The apparatus as set forth in claim 7, wherein during execution,.

the entry programming instruction block initializes a table of values for use by the basis programming blocks to operate on their corresponding subparts of the secret; and

the basis programming blocks' operations on their corresponding subparts of the secret, include looking up values initialized in the table using the basis programming blocks' corresponding subparts of the secret.

10. A machine implemented method for generating a tamper resistant program to operate on a secret, the method comprising the steps of:

a) receiving the secret;

b) partitioning the secret into a plurality of subparts; and

c) generating a plurality of subprograms to correspondingly operate on the subparts of the secret.

11. The method as set forth in claim 10, wherein step (c) includes accessing a library having an entry subprogram, and a basis subprogram to generate the subprograms.

12. The method as set forth in claim 11, wherein during execution,

the entry subprogram initializes a table of values for use by the basis subprograms to operate on their corresponding subparts of the secret; and

the basis subprograms' operations on their corresponding subparts of the secret, include looking up values initialized in the table using the basis subprograms' corresponding subparts of the secret.

13. An apparatus comprising:

an execution unit for executing programming instructions; and

a storage medium having stored thereon a plurality of programming instruction blocks to be executed by the execution unit, the programming instruction blocks being stored in a mutated form, except for at least one, which is stored in a plaintext form, wherein the mutated programming instruction blocks are recovered into the plaintext form during execution on an as needed basis, one or more but not all at a time.

14. The apparatus as set forth in claim 13, wherein each programming instruction block includes a first programming instruction sub-block for performing a task, a second programming instruction sub-block for computing mutation partners for a plurality of memory cells, a key to be employed in said computation of mutation partners, a third programming instruction sub-block for mutating memory cells in accordance with the computed mutation partnering, and a fourth programming instruction sub-block for transferring execution control to another programming instruction block.

15. The apparatus as set forth in claim 14, wherein the first programming instruction sub-block operates on a subpart of a secret.

16. The apparatus as set forth in claim 14, wherein the second programming instruction sub-block computes the mutation partnering by performing a logical XOR operation on a memory cell's identifier and the key.

17. The apparatus as set forth in claim 14, wherein the key is a member of an ordered set of pseudo-randomly selected members, the ordered set having a set size that will provide a required period for a pattern of memory cell mutations, with the memory cells being partnered for mutation in accordance with the computed mutation partnering using th key.

18. The apparatus as set forth in claim 14, wherein the memory cells are divided into two memory cells groups, and pair-wise partnered by the second programming instruction sub-block, with the partnered memory cells being in different group; and the third programming instruction sub-block performs a logical XOR operation on the contents of each pair of partnered memory cells, and alternating between the two memory cell groups for odd and even mutation rounds, in storing the results of the logical XOR operations

19. A machine implemented method for executing a program, the method comprising:

a) executing a first of a plurality of subprograms generated to obfuscate the program;

b) computing mutation partners for a plurality of memory cells storing the plurality of subprograms, using a key, the subprograms being stored initially in the memory cells in a mutated form, except for at least one, which is stored initially in a plaintext form;

c) mutating the memory cells in accordance with the computed mutation partnering to recover a second of the plurality of subprograms for execution.

20. The method as set forth in claim 19, wherein the first and second subprograms operate on a first and a second subpart of a secret.

21. The method as set forth in claim 19, wherein step (b) comprises performing a logical XOR operation on a memory cell's identifier and the key for each memory cell.

22. The method as set forth in claim 19, wherein the key is a member of an ordered set of pseudo-randomly selected members, the ordered set having a set size that will provide a required period for a pattern of memory cell mutations, with the memory cells being partnered for mutation in accordance with the computed mutation partnering using the key.

23. The method as set forth in claim 19, wherein step (c) comprises performing logical XOR operations on the contents of memory cells of a first memory cell group and the contents of memory cells of a second memory cell group, and storing the results of th logical XOR operations into the first memory cell group if step (c) is being

performed for an odd number of times, and the second memory cell group if step (c) is being performed for an even number of times.

24 The method as set forth in claim 19, wherein the method further comprises the steps of:

d) executing the second of the plurality of subprograms;

e) computing mutation partners for the plurality of memory cells; and

f) mutating the memory cells in accordance with the computed mutation partnering to mutate the first of the plurality of subprograms, and recover a third of the plurality of subprograms for execution.

25. An apparatus comprising:

an execution unit for executing programming instructions; and

a storage medium having stored therein a first plurality of programming instructions to be executed by the execution unit, wherein when executed, in response to a program input, the first plurality of programming instructions generate a plurality of subprograms for the program to obfuscate the program, the subprograms being generated in a mutated form, except for at least one, which is generated in a plaintext form, the subprograms being further generated with logic to recover the subprograms in plaintext form on an as needed basis, one or more but not all at a time.

26. The apparatus as set forth in claim 25, wherein the storage medium further having stored therein a table of keylengths to be accessed by the first plurality of programming instructions in generating the subprograms, the keylengths denoting sizes of ordered sets of pseudo-randomly selected members that will provide various required mutation periods.

27. The apparatus as set forth in claim 25, wherein the storage medium further having stored therein a second plurality of programming instructions to be incorporated into each of the generated subprograms by the first plurality of programming instructions for identifying mutation partners for a plurality of memory cells storing the subprograms, for a mutation round, using a key, the key being a member of an ordered set of pseudo-randomly selected members that will provide a mutation period required by the generated subprograms.

28. The apparatus as set forth in claim 25, wherein the storage medium further having stored therein a second plurality of programming instructions to be incorporated into each of the generated subprograms by the first plurality of programming instructions for mutating memory cells storing the generated subprograms in accordance with computed mutation partnerings for a mutation round.

29. The apparatus as set forth in claim 25, wherein the first plurality of programming instructions include logic for analyzing the program for branch flow.

30. The apparatus as set forth in claim 25, wherein the first plurality of programming instructions include logic for performing peephole randomization on the program.

31. The apparatus as set forth in claim 25, wherein the first plurality of programming instructions include restructuring and partitioning the program into the subprograms.

32. The apparatus as set forth in claim 25, wherein the first plurality of programming instructions include logic for scheduling memory cells for the generated subprograms to be recovered in the plaintext form, and determining the appropriate initial values for the memory cells.

33. The apparatus as set forth in claim 32, wherein the first plurality of programming instructions include logic for determining a mutation period requirement for the program, a keylength for the required mutation period, the keylength denoting a set's set size, the set being an ordered set of pseudo-randomly selected members that will provide the required mutation period.

34. The apparatus as set forth in claim 32, wherein the first plurality of programming instructions include logic for selecting a memory cell for a generated subprogram to be recovered in the plaintext form, and determining a Boolean function for recovering the generated subprogram in the plaintext form in terms of initial state values of the memory cells used for storing the generated subprograms.

35. The apparatus as set forth in claim 32, wherein the first plurality of programming instructions include logic for determining mutation partners for a

plurality of memory cells storing the generated subprograms, using a k y of an ordered set of pseudo-randomly selected keys, simulating memory cell mutations in accordance with the determined mutation partnering, and determining a plurality of Boolean functions for the memory cells, the Boolean functions expressing the post mutation states of the memory cells in terms of the memory cells' initial values.

36. A machine implemented method for generating a plurality of subprograms for a program to obfuscate the program, the method comprising the steps:

a) analyzing the program for branch flow;

b) restructuring and partitioning the program into a plurality of subprograms; and

c) determining a schedule in terms of a plurality of memory cells for recovering the subprograms in a plaintext form for execution, and initial state values for the memory cells to store the subprograms in the memory cells in a mutated form, except for at least, which is stored in one of the memory cells in the plaintext form.

37. The machine as set forth in claim 36, wherein step (a) further includes performing peephole randomization on the program.

38. The method as set forth in claim 36, wherein step (c) includes determining a mutation period requirement for the program, a keylength for the required mutation period, the keylength denoting a set's set size, the set being an ordered set of pseudo-randomly selected members that will provide the required mutation period.

39. The method as set forth in claim 36, wherein step (c) includes selecting a memory cell for a generated subprogram to be recovered in the plaintext form, and determining a Boolean function for recovering the generated subprogram in the plaintext form in terms of initial state values of the memory cells used for storing the generated subprograms.

40. The method as set forth in claim 36, wherein step (c) includes determining mutation partners for a plurality of memory cells storing the generated subprograms, using a key of an ordered set of pseudo-randomly selected keys, simulating memory cell mutations in accordance with the determined mutation partnering, and determining a plurality of Boolean functions for the memory cells, the Boolean

functions expressing the post mutation states of the memory cells in terms of th memory cells' initial values.

41. The method as set forth in claim 36, wherein the method further includes step (d) inserting a function and a key into each of the generated subprograms, the function being used for identifying mutation partners for a plurality of memory cells storing the subprograms, for a mutation round, using the key, the key being a member of an ordered set of pseudo-randomly selected members that will provide a mutation period required by the generated subprograms.

42. The method as set forth in claim 36, wherein the method further includes step (d) inserting a function into each of the generated subprograms for mutating memory cells storing the generated subprograms in accordance with computed mutation partnerings for a mutation round.

43. An apparatus comprising:

an execution unit for executing programming instructions;

a storage medium having stored therein a first and a second plurality of programming instructions to be executed by the execution unit, the first and second plurality of programming instructions implementing an application with the first plurality of programming instructions implementing a security sensitive function of the application and the second plurality of programming instructions implementing a non-security sensitive function of the application, the first plurality of programming instructions having incorporated a first defensive technique of distributing a secret in space and in time and/or a second defensive technique of obfuscation to render the first plurality of programming instructions virtually unobservable and unmodifiable during execution.

44. The apparatus as set forth in claim 43, wherein the first plurality of programming instructions incorporated the second defensive technique of obfuscation, including one or more unique ordered sets of pseudo-randomly selected members for generating one or more patterns of memory cell mutations, rendering the application unique from other copies of the application installed on other apparatus.

45. An apparatus comprising:

an xecution unit for ex cuting programming instructions;

a storag medium having stored therein a first, a second, a third, and a fourth, plurality of programming instructions to be executed by the execution unit, the first and second plurality of programming instructions implementing a first and a second integrity verification function for a first and a second application respectively, whereas the third and fourth programming instructions implementing a third and a fourth integrity verification function for a system integrity verification program, all four pluralities of programming instructions having incorporated defensive techniques rendering them tamper resistant, the four pluralities of programming instructions jointly implementing an interlocking trust mechanism, requiring the first and the second pluralities of programming instructions each to cooperate with both the third and fourth pluralities of programming instructions to complete any integrity verification on the apparatus.

46. A machine implemented method for verifying integrity on an apparatus, the method comprising the steps of:

a) a first and a second tamper resistant integrity verification function of a first and a second application of the apparatus individually calling a third tamper resistant integrity verification function of a system integrity verification program to jointly perform integrity verification with the first and second tamper resistant integrity verification functions respectively;

b) in response, the third tamper resistant integrity verification function calling a fourth tamper resistant integrity verification function of the system integrity verification program to jointly perform the requested integrity verifications;

c) the fourth tamper resistant integrity verification function providing the first and the second tamper resistant integrity verification functions with respective results of the requested integrity verifications.

47. An apparatus comprising:

an execution unit for executing programming instructions;

a storage medium having stored therein a first and a second plurality of programming instructions to be executed by the execution unit, and a first secret private key, the first and second pluralities of programming instructions implementing a first and a second tamper resistant decryption function,

the first tamper resistant decryption function being used for recovering a first public key asymmetric to the first secret private key, using a second public

key, th first public k y having been previously encrypted using a second secret private key asymmetric to the second public key,

the second tamper resistant decryption function being used for recovering a content encryption key using the first secret private key, the content encryption key having been previously encrypted using the first public key.

48. The apparatus as set forth in claim 47, wherein the storage medium further having stored therein a third plurality of programming instructions to be executed by the execution unit, the third plurality of programming instructions implementing a third decryption function for recovering content using the recovered content encryption key, the content having been previously encrypted using the content encryption key.

49. A machine implemented method for recovering content, the method comprising the steps of:

a) recovering a first public key using a second public key, the first and second public keys having a first and a second asymmetric private key respectively, the first public key having been previously encrypted by the second private key;

b) providing the recovered first public key to be used for encrypting a content encryption key;

c) receiving the encrypted content encryption key; and

d) recovering the content encryption key using the first private key.

50. The method as set forth in claim 47, wherein the method further comprises the steps of:

e) receiving encrypted content; and

f) recovering content using the recovered content encryption key.


102
Subpart of Secret
101
102
Subpart of Secret
101
100
102
Subpart of Secret
101

**Figure 1**


104
102
Secret
SubProgram Generator
SubPrograms
105
Library
106
Entry SubProgram
108
Basis SubProgram
109
Prologue SubProgram
110
Table

**Figure 2**


Start
Generate Entry SubProgram Including Initialization Code for Initializing at Least a Lookup Table(LKUP), & an Accumulation Variable
112
Generate SubParts of Secret
114
Set LIDX = a SubPart of Secret
116
Generate a Basis SubProgram to Compute A = (A * LKUP(LIDX)) MOD Y )
118
More SubPart ?
120
Yes
No
Generate Prologue SubProgram For Post Processing
122
End

**Figure 3**


Cell 0
Cell 1
Cell i
Cell m/2
OPS SubPgm0
OPS SubPgm2
OPS SubPgm4
204
202
201a
First Memory Segment
Partners
203
Cell m/2 + 1
Cell m/2 + 2
Cell j
Cell m
OPS SubPgm3
OPS SubPgm1
201b
Second Memory Segment

**Figure 4**


Ofuscated SubProgram
204
Original SubProgram
102
Mutation Partner Identification Function
206
Mutation Function
207
Partner Key
208
Jump @ Next SubProgram
209

**Figure 5**


200
Program
214
Ofuscation Processor
Obfuscated Program
203
SPgm 204
SPgm 204
212
Key Length Lookup Table (Period)
Working Matrices
213
206
Partner Identification Function
207
Mutation Function

**Figure 6**


Distribution of Key Period
Distribution of Period
Period
42
36
30
24
18
12
6
Key Length
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Percentage of Keys
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Figure 7


Start
Analyze Program
216
Peep Hole Randomization
218
Restructure & Partition
220
Schedule & Initial Value Computation
221
End

**Figure 8a**


Start
222
Initialize M1
223
Select Memory Cell for Entry SubProgram
224
Update Matrices M2
226
Select Key Length
228
Generate Keys
230
Determine Mutation Partner
232
Simulate Mutation Update M1
B
Select Memory Cell for Next SubProgram
234
Upddate & Insert Matrix M2
235
236
Success ?
No
Yes
237
Unselect Cell & Backout Updates to M2
A
238
Loop Level Changed ?
Yes
No
239
Down/ Up ?
Down
Up
241
Select Key Length
240
Remove Keys
242
Generate & Add Keys
Determine Mutation Partner
243
Simulate Mutation Update M1
244
More SubPrograms ?
Yes
B
245
No
246
Insert Partner Key, Jump Values
247
Compute Initial Values
248
Generate Ofuscated SubPrograms
End

Figure 8b


Start
Execute SubProgram Function
250
Identify Mutation Partners
252
Mutate
254
Last SubProgram ?
256
No
Jump to Next SubProgram
258
Yes
Return

Figure 9


Program
SPGM0 = 000
SPGM1 = 001
SPGM2 = 010
SPGM3 = 011
SPGM4 = 100
SPGM5 = 101
102'
Mutation 0
IV0
IV1
IV2
IV3
IV4
IV5
202'
Mutation 1
IV3 X IV0
IV4 X IV1
IV5 X IV2
Period = 6
Key Length = 1
Key = 3
Mutation Partnership Function:
Partner Cell = Cell ID + 3
M1
IV0 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
C0 1 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 1 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 1 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 1 0
C5 0 0 0 0 0 1
218'a
M2
SPGM0 1 0 0 0 0 0
218'b
SPGM0 → C0
M1
C0 1 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 1 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 1 0 0 0
C3 1 0 0 1 0 0
C4 0 1 0 0 1 0
C5 0 0 1 0 0 1
M2
SPGM0 1 0 0 0 0 0
SPGM1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SPGM1 → C3

**Figure 10**


Mutation 2
IV3
IV4
IV5
IV3 X IV0
IV4 X IV1
IV5 X IV2
202'
M1
IV0 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
C0 0 0 0 1 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 1 0
C2 0 0 0 0 0 1
C3 1 0 0 1 0 0
C4 0 1 0 0 1 0
C5 0 0 1 0 0 1
218'a
M2
IV0 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
SPGM0 1 0 0 0 0 0
SPGM1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SPGM2 0 0 1 0 0 0
218'b
SPGM2 → C1
Mutation 3
IV3
IV4
IV5
IV0
IV1
IV2
M1
IV0 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
C0 0 0 0 1 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 1 0
C2 0 0 0 0 0 1
C3 1 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 1 0 0 0 0
C5 0 0 1 0 0 0
218'a
M2
IV0 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
SPGM0 1 0 0 0 0 0
SPGM1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SPGM2 0 0 1 0 0 0
SPGM3 0 0 0 1 0 0
218'b
SPGM3 → C4
Mutation 4
IV3 X IV0
IV4 X IV1
IV5 X IV2
IV0
IV1
IV2
M1
IV0 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
C0 1 0 0 1 0 0
C1 0 1 0 0 1 0
C2 0 0 1 0 0 1
C3 1 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 1 0 0 0 0
C5 0 0 1 0 0 0
218'a
M2
IV0 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
SPGM0 1 0 0 0 0 0
SPGM1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SPGM2 0 0 1 0 0 0
SPGM3 0 0 0 1 0 0
SPGM4 0 0 0 0 1 1
218'b
SPGM4 → C2

**Figure 11**


Mutation 5
IV3 X IV0
IV4 X IV1
IV5 X IV2
IV3
IV4
IV5
202'
M1
IV0 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
C0 1 0 0 1 0 0
C1 0 1 0 0 1 0
C2 0 0 1 0 0 1
C3 0 0 0 1 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 1 0
C5 0 0 0 0 0 1
218'a
M2
IV0 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
SPGM0 1 0 0 0 0 0
SPGM1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SPGM2 0 0 1 0 0 0
SPGM3 0 0 0 1 0 0
SPGM4 0 0 0 0 1 1
SPGM5 0 0 0 0 0 1
218'b
SPGM5 → C5

**Figure 12**


218'b
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
IV0 IV3 IV4 IV1 IV2 IV5
=
SPGM0 SPGM1 SPGM2 SPGM3 SPGM4 SPGM5
218'c
IV0 IV3 IV4 IV1 IV2 IV5
=
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
SPGM0 SPGM1 SPGM2 SPGM3 SPGM4 SPGM5
IV0 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
=
SPGM0
SPGM3
SPGM4 ⊗ SPGM5
SPGM0 ⊗ SPGM1
SPGM2
SPGM5
0 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
202'
202'
202'
202'
202'
202'

**Figure 13**


SPGM2
202'
SPGM1
M2
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
1 0 0
SPGM4
SPGM5
202'
M5
0 0 1
0 0 1
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
SPGM0
SPGM1
202'
M1
0 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
1 0 0
SPGM4
202'
SPGM3
M4
0 0 1
0 0 1
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
SPGM0
202'
M0
0 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
SPGM2
SPGM3
202'
M3
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
0 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1

Figure 14




**Figure 15**


400a
400b
App1
App2
402a
402b
SSF1
SSF2
1a
1c
2a
2c
404
1b
406a
IVK1
2b
IVK2
406b
System Integrity Verification Program
(SIVP)

**Figure 16**


500
Content Industry Association
K PRI
K PRI CIA [K PUB P]
K PUB P
506
Content Player Product
508
K PRI P, K PUB CIA, K PRI CIA [K PUB P]
Content Player MFR
CTNT
Kc
K PRI CIA [Kc]
K PUB P
K PUB P [Kc]
Kc [CONT]
502
Content MFR
Content Player
504
Kc [CTNT]
K PRI CIA [Kc, Rules]
Kc[CNT]
K PRI CIA [Kc, Rules]
510
Content Reader MFR
Content Reader
K PUB CIA
512

Figure 17


600
CPU
602
CACHE
604
Host Bridge
606
High Perf. I/O Bus
608
Main Memory
612
Video Memory
614
Display
616
I/O Bus Bridge
610
Std. I/O Bus
618
KeyBoard/Pointing Device
622
Mass Storage
620

Figure 18


700
System Bus
706
ROM
704
Main Memory
708
I/O Controller
702
CPU

Figure 19

# INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

International application No.
PCT/US97/10359

A. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT MATTER
IPC(6) :H04K 1/00
US CL :395/186
According to International Patent Classification (IPC) or to both national classification and IPC

B. FIELDS SEARCHED

Minimum documentation searched (classification system followed by classification symbols)

U.S. : 395/186, 187.01, 188.01; 380/ 4, 23, 24

Documentation searched other than minimum documentation to the extent that such documents are included in the fields searched

Electronic data base consulted during the international search (name of data base and, where practicable, search terms used)

APS, STN (WPIDS)

C. DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT

| Category* | Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages | Relevant to claim No. |
|---|---|---|
| Y | US 4,786,790 (KRUSE et al.) 22 November 1988, see the abstract, see col. 2, lines 20-56. | 10-12, 19-24, 36-42 |
| Y | US 4,926,480 (CHAUM) 15 May 1990, see the abstract | 1-50 |
| Y | US 5,224,160 (PAULINI et al.) 29 June 1993, see the abstract and col. 6, lines 28-45. | 1-50 |
| Y | US 5,265,164 (MATYAS et al.) 23 November 1993, see fig. 10. | 1-50 |

[X] Further documents are listed in the continuation of Box C. [ ] See patent family annex.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| * | Special categories of cited documents: | "T" | later document published after the international filing date or priority date and not in conflict with the application but cited to understand the principle or theory underlying the invention |
| "A" | document defining the general state of the art which is not considered to be of particular relevance | "X" | document of particular relevance; the claimed invention cannot be considered novel or cannot be considered to involve an inventive step when the document is taken alone |
| "E" | earlier document published on or after the international filing date | "Y" | document of particular relevance; the claimed invention cannot be considered to involve an inventive step when the document is combined with one or more other such documents, such combination being obvious to a person skilled in the art |
| "L" | document which may throw doubts on priority claim(s) or which is cited to establish the publication date of another citation or other special reason (as specified) | "&" | document member of the same patent family |
| "O" | document referring to an oral disclosure, use, exhibition or other means | | |
| "P" | document published prior to the international filing date but later than the priority date claimed | | |

| Date of the actual completion of the international search | Date of mailing of the international search report |
|---|---|
| 22 AUGUST 1997 | 05 NOV 1997 |
| Name and mailing address of the ISA/US<br>Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks<br>Box PCT<br>Washington, D.C. 20231<br>Facsimile No. (703) 305-3230 | Authorized officer<br>ALBERT DECADY<br>Telephone No. (703) 308-3900 |

Form PCT/ISA/210 (second sheet)(July 1992)*

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

International application No.
PCT/US97/10359

C (Continuation). DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT

| Category* | Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages | Relevant to claim No. |
|---|---|---|
| X | US 5,347,579 (BLANDFORD) 13 September 1994, col. 5, lines 24-56. | 1-9, 25-35, 43-50 |
| Y | | 10-12, 19-24, 36-42 |
| Y | US 5,535,276 (GANESAN) 09 July 1996, see the abstract, col. 2, lines 55-62, col. 10, lines 33 et seq. | 1-50 |